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COMMENTS
DEFAMATION AND MEDIA DEFENDANTS IN TEXAS
by Bill Van Wagner
Since the drafting of the 1836 Constitution, Texas has recognized the
guarantee to the press of the right to publish freely its ideas in order to
promote the "search for truth [and to maintain this state's] democratic in-
stitutions."' The founders of the Republic and the authors of Texas con-
stitutions have, however, consistently placed limits on this constitutional
privilege by subjecting the press to liability when the privilege was abused.
The most recognized abuse, the libel 2 of Texas citizens, has been the sub-
ject of considerable litigation since the early years of statehood.3 Because
of the nature of the competing rights, severe tensions continue to exist be-
tween the Texas constitutional right of freedom of the press and the indi-
vidual's right to protect his name from being libeled.
In 1964 the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan4 granted the press broad constitutional protection when
publishing defamatory statements concerning public officials. Later
Supreme Court decisions expanded this constitutional protection to in-
dude publications concerning public figures 5 and publications addressing
matters of public concern.6 New York Times and its progeny effectively
altered over 100 years of Texas law that had clearly favored the individ-
ual's right to protect his reputation over the press's right freely to dissemi-
nate news.7 In a 1974 decision, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,8 the Supreme
Court began a gradual retraction of the broad constitutional privilege
1. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8, Comment (Vernon 1955). The 1836 Constitution of the
Republic of Texas provided that every citizen "shall be at liberty to speak, write, or publish
his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege." REPUBLIC OF
TEX. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1836). The authors of the current constitution of
Texas adopted identical language. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2. Libel is defined in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5430 (Vernon 1958), which pro-
vides:
A libel is a defamation expressed in printing or writing, or by signs and
pictures, or drawings tending to blacken the memory of the dead, or tending to
injure the reputation of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or financial injury, or to impeach the honesty,
integrity, or virtue, or reputation of any one, or to publish the natural defects
of any one and thereby expose such person to public hatred, ridicule, or
financial injury.
3. See, e.g., Holt v. Parsons, 23 Tex. 9 (1859); Yarborough v. Tate, 14 Tex. 483 (1855).
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
6. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
7. See notes 16-76 infra and accompanying text.
8. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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granted to the press. In Gertz the Court rejected a previous decision that
had granted the press constitutional protection when publishing matters of
public concern.9 More importantly, however, the Court returned a large
area of defamation law to the states by holding that, so long as they did not
impose strict liability, the states could define the appropriate standard of
liability for publishers libeling private individuals.' 0
The Texas Supreme Court responded to this series of United States
Supreme Court decisions in Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc. ,II which
establishes the current limits in Texas of the media's federal constitutional
protection when publishing defamatory statements. This Comment exam-
ines the Texas Supreme Court's historical approach to media defendants
and discusses the development of the constitutional privilege accorded the
press by the United States Supreme Court to provide both background and
rationale for the results in Foster. After reviewing two recent Supreme
Court decisions, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association12 and Hutchinson v.
Proxmire,13 this Comment concludes that Foster is compatible with the
present scope of the media's constitutional protection as defined by the
United States Supreme Court.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LIBEL IN TEXAS
Every man has a clear and indisputable legal right to be secure not
only in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, but also in his
reputation and good name; and for every invasion of this right he has
a legal claim to redress by a civil action. '4
With the recognition of the civil tort of defamation in Texas, the stage was
set for the battle between the state constitutional right to freedom of the
press and the individual's common law right to protect his reputation.
Historically, the press has had an absolute privilege to report on judicial
9. Id. at 346.
10. Id. at 348.
11. 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
12. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
13. 443 U.S. ill (1979).
14. Yarborough v. Tate, 14 Tex. 483, 486 (1855). In the presence of others, the defend-
ant in Yarborough called plaintiff a "damned old cow-thief." Id. at 483. The evidence
showed that the defendant had been drinking and appeared to be angry when he made the
accusation. The trial court charged the jury that the defendant should be found guilty only
if the evidence showed that he had intentionally imputed to plaintiff the crime of stealing
cows. The jury found no such intention and returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.
On appeal, the supreme court reyersed, stating that "(i]t was proved indisputably that [the
accusations] were uttered by the defendant of the plaintiff publicly, and not only in earnest,
but in anger, constituting, unexplained, primafacie, a willful and malicious slander." Id. at
486. The defendant failed to rebut plaintiffs prima facie case and, accordingly, a new trial
was ordered. Although Yarborough was a slander action, the Texas Supreme Court soon
recognized the civil action for libel in Holt v. Parsons, 23 Tex. 9 (1859). In Holt the defend-
ants, who were members of the board of trustees of a church, passed a resolution declaring
that plaintiff improperly removed funds from the church coffers. The jury found that de-
fendants acted with malicious intent and held them liable for their libelous statements. The
supreme court affirmed, holding that the communication was neither privileged nor pub-
lished without malice. Id. at 21-22.
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and legislative proceedings. 15 Despite the absolute nature of the privilege,
the Texas Supreme Court, in its first review of the protection accorded to
publications of statements made during a legislative committee meeting,
held that the publications were not privileged. In A.H Belo & Co. v.
Wren 16 the media defendant published a committee member's statements
that accused an individual of being involved in illegal land transactions.
The defendant claimed that the publication was a true reprint of legislative
proceedings and therefore was privileged under the common law.' 7 The
court held, however, that the publication was not privileged because the
committee meeting was an ex parte proceeding convened after the ad-
journment of the legislative sessions.' 8 Even though the court recognized
the need for quick dissemination of useful facts, it concluded that defama-
tory statements could not be protected by broadly construing the absolute
privilege allowing publication of legislative proceedings. That privilege,
the court reasoned, was adopted solely for the benefit of the public and
thus should not be construed to benefit the press. 19 Representative of the
court's attitude toward the press is its statement that the press "cannot de-
feat the ends of justice, and the objects of the criminal law, for the purpose
merely of satisfying the public craving for news and information. '20 The
Texas Supreme Court maintained a similar position through 1950,2I and
the attitude expressed in Wren may be present in the court today. 22
Express Printing Co. v. Copeland23 appeared to be irreconcilable with
Wren because it evidenced a judicial retreat from the imposition of re-
straint on publications of the press.24 Copeland involved an attack by a
15. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 114, at 777-82 (4th ed. 1971).
16. 63 Tex. 686 (1884).
17. Common law recognized an absolute immunity for defamatory statements made in
the course of legislative debates, voting, reports, and work in-committee. See, e.g., W. PROS-
SER, supra note 15, § 116, at 800-01; Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation, 10 COLUM.
L. REV. 131, 134-35 (1910). The same immunity is accorded to Congressmen through the
speech or debate clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 3. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 204 (1880) (the speech or debate clause exempts members of Congress from liabil-
ity elsewhere for any vote, report, or action in their respective houses, as well as for oral
debate); Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808) (slanderous language used in a conversation be-
tween certain members of the House, even though not delivered in an address or speech on
the floor of the House, is accorded absolute immunity when the language relates to proceed-
ings in the House). But cf. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (the speech or
debate clause does not provide immunity for Congressman's libelous statements transmitted
by his newsletters).
18. 63 Tex. at 722.
19. Id. at 725-26.
20. Id. at 725.
21. See Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub. Co., 149 Tex. 87, 228 S.W.2d 499 (1950), discussed
at notes 63-76 infra and accompanying text.
22. See Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1123 (1976), discussed at notes 123-57 infra and accompanying text.
23. 64 Tex. 354 (1885).
24. One legal scholar was unable to reconcile Wren and Copeland because the Wren
court had refused to balance the competing interests involved while the Copeland court ar-
rived at its holding by just such a balance. See Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEXAS L. REV. 41,
91 (1929). The cases are reconcilable, however, because each represents the judiciary's at-
tempt to define limitations on the media's right to freedom of the press in two distinct areas.
Wren defined the limitations on the media's privilege to report on legislative proceedings
1980]
SOUTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL
newspaper on a mayoral candidate who allegedly mishandled the funds of
an estate for which he was the executor. The supreme court held that pub-
lications concerning the qualifications of a candidate for public office were
not actionable as long as they were true, or upon probable cause, believed
to be true.25 With reasoning similar to that of Wren, the court in Copeland
construed the right of the press to disseminate news on the basis of the
benefit to be derived by the public. Contrary to Wren, however, the court
concluded that any restrictions on the rights of the press beyond those that
it had announced would unnecessarily interfere with the public's right to
select officers for offices created by the public. 26
In 1901 the Texas legislature recognized the continuing conflict between
the rights of the press and the rights of the individual and sought to rem-
edy the situation by passing the first civil libel statute.27 The statute specif-
ically defined libel,28 provided that truth was a defense,29 and noted that
other matters might be considered in mitigation of exemplary damages.30
Of particular importance to the press, the statute codified the privileges of
publishing: (1) a fair, true, and impartial account of judicial proceedings,
(2) a fair, true, and impartial account of legislative proceedings including
legislative debates and committee meetings, (3) a fair, true, and impartial
account of public meetings held for public purposes, and (4) a reasonable
and fair comment of matters of public concern and official acts of public
while Copeland defined limitations on the media's privilege to report on political candidates.
The Copeland court apparently concluded that publications concerning the qualifications of
candidates were not published for the purpose of "satisfying the public craving for news"
(see text accompanying note 20 supra), but rather were published for the purpose of inform-
ing the citizens of the qualifications of candidates seeking to represent them. 64 Tex. at 358.
25. 64 Tex. at 358.
26. Id. Although never expressly overruled, Copeland was effectively rejected in later
decisions. See, e.g., Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub. Co., 149 Tex. 87, 228 S.W.2d 499 (1950);
A.H. Belo & Co. v. Looney, 112 Tex. 160, 245 S.W. 777 (1922).
27. 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 26, at 30-31.
28. Id. § 1, at 30. The 1901 statutory definition for libel has survived the years and is
now embodied in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5430 (Vernon 1958). See note 2 supra. In
Guisti v. Galveston Tribune, 105 Tex. 497, 504-06, 150 S.W. 874, 876-77 (1912), the court
construed the libel definition as altering the common law in two ways. First, the court con-
cluded that a defamatory publication need not impute a penal offense to be libel per se.
Secondly, the statutory definition permitted an action for a libelous publication whether or
not the publication was libel per se. Significantly, however, the statute did not alter the
common law rule that a publication, if true, had to be a cause for an official's removal from
office before it would be considered libel per se. See, e.g., Cotulla v. Kerr, 74 Tex. 89, 11
S.W. 1058 (1889). In Texas libel per se is defined as words that are "so obviously hurtful to
the person aggrieved by them that they require no proof of their injurious character to make
them actionable." Rawlins v. McKee, 327 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 26, § 2, at 30. This provision reaffirmed Texas common
law. See, e.g., Patten v. A.H. Belo & Co., 79 Tex. 41, 46, 14 S.W. 1037, 1039 (1890).
30. The statute provided:
In any action for libel the defendant may give in evidence, if specifically
pleaded, in mitigation of exemplary or punitive damages, the circumstances
and intentions under which the libelous publication was made, and any public
apology, correction or retraction made and published by him of the libel com-
plained of. The truth of the statement or statements in such publication shall
a defense to such action.




The privileges concerning fair, true, and impartial accounts of judicial
proceedings and public meetings and the privilege involving fair comment
merely affirmed common law.32 The privilege applying to legislative pro-
ceedings, however, raised a question about the validity of Wren. In 1919
the legislature eliminated many doubts as to the intent of the privilege by
amending the statute to eliminate the requirement that the legislative
meeting be a matter of record.33 The scope of the privilege and the 1919
amendment clearly could bring ex parte legislative proceedings, like those
in Wren, conducted after adjournment of the legislature, within the protec-
tion of the statutory privilege. The codification of the privilege was there-
fore a significant success for the press. Nevertheless, the codification of
civil libel laws also placed several burdens on the press. For example, the
press could be held liable for truthful but defamatory statements if the
plaintiff were able to prove that the statements were published with actual
31. Id. § 3, at 30. The text of the privileges provided:
The publication of the following matters by any newspaper or periodical, as
defined in Section 1, shall be deemed privileged, and shall not be made the
basis of any action for libel without proof of actual malice.
1. A fair, true and impartial account of the proceedings in a court of jus-
tice, unless the court prohibits the publication of the same, when in the judg-
ment of the court the ends of justice demand that the same should not be
published, and the court so orders; or any other official proceedings author-
ized by law in the administration of the law.
2. A fair, true and impartial account of all executive and legislative pro-
ceedings that are made a matter of record, including reports of legislative
committees, and of any debate in the Legislature and in its committees.
3. A fair, true and impartial account of public meetings, organized and
conducted for public purposes only.
4. A reasonable and fair comment or criticism of the official acts of public
officials and of other matters of public concern published for general informa-
tion.
Id.
32. See W. PROSSER, supra note 15, §§ 14-15.
33. 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 25, § 1, at 34. The legislature amended the statute so that
the privilege included:
2. A fair, true and impartial account of all executive and legislative proceed-
ings, including-all reports of and proceedings in or before legislative commit-
tees, and of any debate or statement in or before the Legislature or in or before
any of its committees, and including also, all reports of and proceedings in or
before the managing boards of educational and eleemosynary institutions sup-
ported from the public revenue, of city councils or other governing bodies of
cities or towns, of the commissioners' court of any county, and of the board of
trustees of the public schools of any district or city, and of any debate or state-
ment in or before any such body.
Id.
The legislature left little doubt as to its intentions in amending the statute:
The fact that there is doubt with respect to the right of newspapers and
other periodicals to publish a fair, true and impartial account of reports of
proceedings in and before legislative committees, or of any debate or state-
ment in or before the Legislature, or in or before any of its committees, and
the fact that proceedings are now pending before legislative committees with
respect to which it is of importance that the public be fully advised, creates an
emergency . . ..
d. § 2, at 34-35.
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malice.34
The codification of the fair comment privilege was perhaps the most
important aspect of the 1901 legislation for the press because the privilege
required only that the publication be a fair and reasonable comment rather
than a true and impartial account of the information contained in the pub-
lication. Additionally, because judges and legislative members could be
considered public officials and many public meetings could be classified as
matters of public concern, numerous publications that might be in viola-
tion of the other three privileges had the potential of being protected under
the fair comment privilege. In Galveston Tribune v. Johnson,35 however,
the court strictly interpreted the fair comment privilege. Johnson involved
a publication of defamatory statements allegedly made by a state represen-
tative in front of the legislative body. Holding for the plaintiff, the court
concluded that the fair comment privilege protected only comment, which
is the opinion of the writer, as distinguished from fact.36 The Johnson de-
cision, in effect, mandated the press to determine prior to publication
whether its statement was comment rather than fact.37 The court's holding
placed the press in a precarious position because the courts themselves
found it difficult to determine the nature of a particular statement. 38
The Johnson court's construction of the fair comment privilege was
adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in A. H. Belo & Co. v. Looney.39 In
Looney the defendant presented a fair comment defense to a libel action
brought by the Texas attorney general in his private capacity. The attor-
ney general alleged that editorials in the Galveston Daily News and Dallas
Morning News contained defamatory statements concerning his motives in
prosecuting two oil companies and a railroad under Texas antitrust laws.
The publisher attempted to establish that the publication was in the form
34. 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 26, § 3, at 30. Although the term "actual malice" was not
consistently defined at common law, Texas courts generally defined it as intending to cause
ill will to the injured party. See Hallen, The Texas Libel Laws, 5 TEXAS L. REV. 335, 355
(1927). When a libelous publication was actionable per se, a rebuttable presumption arose
that the libel was published with ill will. See, e.g., Holt v. Parsons, 23 Tex. 9, 21 (1859);
Forke v. Homann, 39 S.W. 210, 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref d). In 1927, however, the
legislature eliminated this qualification by removing from the statute the phrase "without
actual malice." Whether this purposeful omission has any significance is left in doubt by the
Texas Supreme Court's conclusion in Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub. Co., 149 Tex. 87, 228
S.W.2d 499 (1950), that the fair comment privilege could be overcome by a finding of actual
malice. Id. at 98, 228 S.W.2d at 505. See notes 74-76 infra and accompanying text.
35. 141 S.W. 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, writ ref d). In Johnson the defendant published
an article stating that the plaintiff, a state legislator, resorted to misrepresentations, slander,
and profanity during a legislative hearing. The legislator filed a libel action, claiming that
the publication was false. The plaintiff argued that the publication was privileged because it
was a fair and reasonable comment on a public official. The court of civil appeals rejected
plaintiff's claim, holding that the publication was fact as distinguished from comment. Id. at
304. Accordingly, the court concluded that the fair comment privilege was not applicable.
Id.
36. Id. at 304; see text accompanying and following notes 45-49 infra.
37. In a dictum the Johnson court implied that it would have been sufficient for the
press to have shown that its publication was substantially true. 141 S.W. at 306. Signifi-
cantly, this requirement would be less rigorous than the plain meaning of the statute.
38. See Hallen, supra note 24, at 53-74.
39. 112 Tex. 160, 246 S.W. 777 (1922).
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of fair comment and could not be libelous unless it was unfair or unrea-
sonable. The court of civil appeals agreed with the publisher's position, 40
but the supreme court rejected the publisher's construction of the statute.4 '
To determine what was a fair and reasonable comment of a public official,
the supreme court looked to the common law rule that a publication was
libel per se if it imputed corrupt motives to a public official.4 2 The court,
in reasoning that a libelous comment could not be fair and reasonable,
concluded that publication of such a comment was not privileged and
could only be defended by proof that the comment was true. 43 The court's
mechanical analysis failed to recognize that, theoretically, the fairness or
reasonableness of comment, a statement of opinion, does not depend on its
truth." As a result, the press was effectively placed in a position of strict
liability when commenting on the moral deficiencies of a public official.
One publication complained of in Looney was a reprint of proceedings
that took place in a chamber of commerce meeting. For purposes of con-
struing the statutory privilege concerning public meetings, the court as-
sumed that the meeting was public but held that the publication was not
entitled to the protection of the statutory privilege.4 5 The court reasoned
that the statements made by the persons attending the meeting imputed
bad motives to the plaintiff, and therefore were not entitled to a defense of
fair comment. 46 The court further reasoned that because the actual state-
ments made at the meeting were not fair comment, the publisher could not
be released from liability merely because it was acting as a purveyor of the
news.
47
The Looney court's construction of the public meeting privilege was im-
proper because the court confused that privilege with the fair comment
privilege. The public meeting privilege did not require the press to estab-
lish the reasonableness of the information published about the meeting,
but required the publication to be a true, fair, and impartial account of the
meeting.4 8 The court concluded that to consider the press free from liabil-
ity when acting as a purveyor of the news would be inconsistent with hold-
ing it liable when editorializing.4 9 Under the facts in Looney, both logic
and consistency demand that these two functions of the press be distin-
guished. When a publisher editorializes, he analyzes a particular issue and
then reports his opinion concerning the issue. When a publisher acts as a
purveyor of the news, he attempts to gather factual information and report
40. A.H. Belo & Co. v. Looney, 246 S.W. 762 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1916), rey'd,
112 Tex. 160, 246 S.W. 777 (1922).
41. 112 Tex. at 175-76, 246 S.W. at 783.
42. Id. at 178, 246 S.W. at 784.
43. Id. at 178-79, 246 S.W. at 784.
44. See Galveston Tribune v. Johnson, 141 S.W. 302, 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, writ
refd). See also text accompanying note 36 supra.
45. 112 Tex. at 179, 246 S.W. at 784.
46. Id. at 178-79, 246 S.W. at 784.
47. Id.
48. 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 26, § 3, at 30; see note 31 supra and accompanying text.
49. 112 Tex. at 179, 246 S.W. at 784.
1980]
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the facts as he discovers them. Editorializing and purveying are two dis-
tinct functions of the press and the legislature reasonably provided two
different standards for each to determine whether a defamatory publica-
tion is privileged.
Looney made several propositions clear. First, the decision reaffirmed
Johnson, which held that the fair comment privilege was not applicable to
publications dealing with facts.50 Moreoever, if the publication were com-
ment or criticism, the fair comment privilege could be claimed by the press
only when it could prove the comment to be fair and reasonable. 5 1 Fi-
nally, similar to the Wren court's strict construction of the common law
privilege relating to legislative proceedings, the Looney court strictly con-
strued the statutory privileges relating to fair comment and public meet-
ings. Arguably, the court essentially ignored the statutory privileges,
stating that with respect to libelous publications, "publishers of newspa-
pers were placed on the same plane as other members of the commu-
nity." 52
The court in Looney concluded that any radical departure from the
common law of libel would have to be accomplished by the legislature
using statutory language that unmistakably departed from the common
law and suggested no other reasonable interpretation. 53 In 1927 the legis-
lature responded by enacting significant amendments to the civil libel stat-
utes.54 The major revisions concerned article 5432, which was amended to
eliminate the words "without actual malice," to expand the public meeting
privilege to include all statements made at a public meeting, and to add a
provision providing that subsequent publications of statements that were
privileged under the statute were not actionable as long as they addressed
matters of public concern and were not published with actual malice.55
The expansion of the public meeting privilege appeared to be a direct at-
tack on that portion of the Looney opinion construing that privilege. The
addition that sanctioned certain republications was important to the press
because plaintiffs now carried the burden of proving not only that a repub-
lication was no longer of public concern but also that the newspaper acted
with actual malice in reprinting the article.
Even after the enactment of the 1927 amendments, Texas courts contin-
ued to construe narrowly the fair comment privilege. In Bell Pub. Co. v.
50. Id. at 176, 246 S.W. at 782.
51. Id., 246 S.W. at 783.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 177, 246 S.W. at 783.
54. 1927 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 80, at 121-22.
55. Id. § 2, at 121-22. To give added emphasis to the intent of, and necessity for, the
amendments, the legislature stated:
The fact that there is now no law in this State adequately providing defenses
for libel or adequately defining privileged matters, and that in consequence of
this condition, the people are denied adequate and proper information con-
cerning their government, candidates for public office and other matters affect-
ing their welfare creates an emergency . . ..
Id. § 3, at 122.
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Garrett Engineering Co.56 the city of Temple was embroiled in a hotly con-
tested public issue concerning the construction of a municipal power plant.
The city had contracted with Garrett to act as a consultant and supervising
engineer in the construction of the new plant. The defendant's newspaper,
relying on statements made by a local citizen, had published certain de-
famatory statements concerning Garrett.5 7 Garrett sued and upon a jury
finding that the publication was false the court held the publisher liable for
damages. 58 On appeal the defendant contended that the publication repre-
sented a fair comment on a matter of public concern. Because prior case
law had not dealt with the fair comment defense as applied to publications
concerning private parties, the commission of appeals relied on cases inter-
preting the defense only as applied to public officials. 59 Based on these
decisions, the court concluded that when the fair comment defense was
raised in an action between private parties, the availability of the privilege
depended on whether the publication consisted of comment or fact.60
Finding that the defendant's publication was based on fact that was mis-
stated, the appellate court affirmed. 6I Although the court strictly con-
strued the fair comment privilege, its interpretation of the privilege was
less restrictive than that displayed in Looney.62
Seven years after Garrett Engineering, the Texas Supreme Court decided
Fitzarrald v. Panhandle Pub. Co. 63 In Fitzarrald the plaintiff was a
county attorney who, at the time of the publication, was running for re-
election. After the defendant's newspaper had published a reprint of a
circular distributed by a candidate running for county sheriff, the plaintiff
sued, claiming that the publication was defamatory. The trial court found
the publication to be libel per se,64 but the court of appeals reversed, hold-
ing that the entire publication was privileged as fair comment.65 On ap-
peal, the Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that some
statements were libelous per se but others were not.66 Although recogniz-
56. 170 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1943, judgmt adopted).
57. The newspaper had published an article stating that Garrett had no persons on its
staff who were either practical or degreed engineers. The article further claimed that Garrett
had never performed work similar to that which it had contracted to undertake for the city.
Id. at 201.
58. Id. at 202.
59. Id. at 204.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 204-05.
62. Id. at 205. Garrett Engineering refused to adopt the liberal construction given to the
privilege in Express Printing Co. v. Copeland, 64 Tex. 354 (1885). Instead, it accepted the
part of the Looney holding that any misstatement of fact by the press was not entitled to the
protection of the fair comment privilege. 170 S.W.2d at 205. The court made no reference,
however, to the implication in Looney that comment, if untrue, was not entitled to the pro-
tection of the fair comment privilege.
63. 149 Tex. 87, 228 S.W.2d 499 (1950).
64. Id. at 90-91, 228 S.W.2d at 501-02.
65. Panhandle Publishing Co. v. Fitzjarrald, 223 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1949), rev'd, 149 Tex. 87, 228 S.W.2d 499 (1950).
66. 149 Tex. at 98, 228 S.W.2d at 506. The Fitzjarra/d court agreed that a political
candidate's fitness to hold office was a matter of public concern that was a proper subject for
discussion and fair and reasonable comment (id. at 96, 228 S.W.2d at 504), but that if an
1980]
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ing that the purpose of the fair comment privilege was to protect the press
when publishing matters of public concern,67 the court again narrowly
construed the statutory privilege. As in Looney, the Fitzjarrald court
stated that the media's privilege existed because the public needed to know
about their elected officials and other matters of public concern and not
because the media had a right to freely disseminate the news.68 Although
the distinction is academic, it is pertinent to an understanding of the
court's imposition of restrictions on the press. The court had committed
itself to zealously guarding the right of a citizen to defend his reputation, 69
but it also had recognized a newspaper's privilege to make "[a] reasonable
and fair comment. . . of the official acts of public officials . . . published
for general information. '70 If the fair comment privilege existed because
of the constitutional right to freedom of the press, judicial limitations on
that right would be difficult to justify.71 In comparison, if the fair com-
ment privilege existed because of the public's interest in knowing the qual-
ifications of their elected officials, judical limitations placed upon that
interest could be explained more easily.
The Fitzjarrald court construed the fair comment privilege in a manner
similar to that in Looney, holding that the fair comment privilege did not
apply to false publications that would subject a public official to removal
from office72 and that therefore, under certain circumstances, the privilege
would not attach until the publisher could prove the truth of its publica-
tion.73 This conclusion is not acceptable, however, because the validity of
comment does not depend on its truthfulness. The court's position can be
explained only on the basis of its strong interest in protecting an individ-
ual's right to preserve his reputation.
Fitzjarrald's strict construction of the statutory privilege was further evi-
denced by the apparent holding that even if a publication were entitled to
the protection of the fair comment privilege, the privilege could be over-
untrue publication could be grounds for removing the official from office, the publication
was libelous per se. Id. at 97, 228 S.W.2d at 505.
67. The court stated: "Article 5432 was enacted to soften the harsh rule that had sub-
jected newspapers to damages for publishing certain matters. Id. at 97, 228 S.W.2d at
505.
68. Id. at 94-95, 228 S.W.2d at 503-04.
69. Id. at 94, 228 S.W.2d at 503.
70. Id.
71. In Express Printing Co. v. Copeland, 64 Tex. 354 (1885), the court approached the
fringes of a constitutional argument, stating:
The tendency in the English courts is more liberal in protecting the freedom
of the press, and the holding there is in accord with the conclusions an-
nounced in this opinion, and which we believe to be well founded in reason
and more nearly in accord with the spirit of constitutional liberty, and free
republican institutions.
Id. at 359.
72. 149 Tex. at 97, 228 S.W.2d at 505.
73. The court's approach is similar to that suggested in Hallen, supra note 24, at 98. But
cf. Galveston Tribune v. Johnson, 141 S.W. 302, 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, writ ref'd) (stat-
ing that a standard of truth could not be applied to the fair comment privilege because
comment is based on opinion rather 'than fact).
[Vol. 34
COMMENTS
come by a jury's finding that the publisher acted with actual malice.74 The
court's holding is contrary to the 1927 statutory amendment that elimi-
nated the provision that the privileges could be defeated by a showing of
actual malice on the part of the publisher.75 Arguably, the amendment
changed the status of the statutory privileges from conditional to absolute,
but the court ignored this possibility.76
The position of the Fijarrald court is significant because it represents
the state of pre-1964 Texas libel law as applied to media publications con-
cerning public officials and other matters of public concern. The Fitzjar-
raid decision illustrates the court's restrictive position concerning media
rights first evidenced in Wren. In 1964, however, the United States
Supreme Court's landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
appeared to mandate a change in the Texas judiciary's approach to media
defendants.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan77 the United States Supreme Court
radically changed the direction of defamation law. Prior to New York
Times the Supreme Court had consistently rejected all suggestions that the
first amendment78 protected defamatory statements made by the press.79
The facts of New York Times gave the Court an opportunity to reconsider
the tensions that existed between the first amendment right of freedom of
the press and a public official's right to protect his reputation. The New
York Times had run a full page advertisement, paid for by sixty-four per-
sons who were not associated with the newspaper, that falsely accused the
Montgomery, Alabama, police department of acts of violence and harass-
ment against students of the Alabama State College and Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King. The state courts, finding that the publication was libel per se
and that it was published with actual malice, held that it was not privileged
74. See 149 Tex. at 98, 228 S.W.2d at 505. Hallen, supra note 24, at 98, suggested that
such a finding would not be unreasonable because a malicious comment would not be fair,
and therefore the comment would not be within the protection of the privilege.
75. 1927 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 80, § 2, at 122.
76. See Hallen, supra note 34, at 358. In a subsequent article, Hallen retreated from his
original position, stating that the legislature's elimination of the words "without proof of
actual malice" had no change on the effect of the fair comment privilege. See Hallen, supra
note 24, at 98.
77. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
78. The first amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST.
amend I. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Supreme Court first suggested
that the states were bound by the first amendment. The Court stated that "[for present
purposes we may and do assume that freedom of. . . the press-which [is] protected by the
First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-[is] among the fundamental personal
rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States." Id. at 66. Until 1964, however, the court failed to accord consti-
tutional protection to the press when publishing defamatory statements. See New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
79. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 293 n.7 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 68 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
715 (1931); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
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as fair comment and that the newspaper was liable for both actual and
punitive damages.80 Reversing the state courts, the United States Supreme
Court held that the constitution "prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."' 8' The Court reasoned that even though open debate may
cause vehement and caustic attacks on individuals, "debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... ,,82 Further
strengthening the position of the media defendant, the Court held that the
public official must show with "convincing clarity" that the publisher acted
with actual malice.83
The New York Times Court declined to make a definitive statement on
who could be considered a public official or what constituted official con-
duct.84 In subsequent decisions, however, the category of public officials
came to include judges, 85 court clerks,86 chiefs of police,87 deputy chiefs of
police,88 mayors and candidates for public office,89 deputy sheriffs,90 and
former government employees being attacked for their past official con-
duct.91 Moreover, by 1971 the Court had stated that the "official conduct"
requirement had become substantially diluted, and that the requirement
might be of little significance when the action involved either a public offi-
cial or candidate for public office.
92
Deciding that the public official concept did not afford the media
enough first amendment protection, the Supreme Court expanded that
protection in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Buts93 when it applied the New York
Times rule to public figures. 94 The Court's zeal did not end with Butts,
80. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd, 376 U.S.
254, 262-63 (1964).
81. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
82. Id. at 270-71. The Court's reasoning parallels that found in an early Texas decision,
Express Printing Co. v. Copeland, 64 Tex. 354 (1885). See notes 23-26 supra and accompa-
nying text.
83. 376 U.S. at 285-86. For discussions of the impact of New York Times, see Berney,
Libel and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 1 (1965);
Hanson, Developments in the Law of Libel: Impact of the New York Times Rule, 7 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 215 (1966); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern
Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1964).
84. 376 U.S. at 283 n.23.
85. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
86. Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
87. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
88. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
89. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
90. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
91. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
92. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274 (1971); see note 137 infra.
93. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
94. In Butts the plaintiff was the athletic director at the University of Georgia. He had
previously served as head football coach at the University and was well-known in athletic
circles. Defendant's magazine published an article that accused Butts of having given the
University of Georgia's detailed game plan to an opposing coach. Butts brought a common
law libel action and was awarded $460,000 in damages. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit,
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however, because in 1971 the Court held in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc. 95 that the New York Times rule would apply to all media defamatory
publications concerning general or public interest.96 Rosenbloom thus ef-
fectively eliminated the need for the public figure concept. 97
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 98 the Court retreated from the "overex-
tension" of the constitutional protection granted to the media by Rosen-
bloom.99 In Gertz an attorney sued a publisher who provided a monthly
Curtis asserted that the trial court should be reversed because Curtis was a media defendant
and thus entitled to the constitutional protection announced in New York Times. The court
of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that Curtis had waived its constitutional claims
by not raising them at the trial level. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702, 713 (5th
Cir. 1965), rev'd, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that New York
Times did not give fair warning to Curtis that it might have a constitutional claim. 388 U.S.
at 144. The Court then addressed the merits of Curtis' constitutional claims. Noting that the
defamatory publications concerning Butts were similar to those in New York Times, the
Court held that defamatory publications concerning public figures were entitled to constitu-
tional protection. Id. at 154-55. The Court recognized that a private individual can became
a public figure either by the status of his position or by thrusting himself into the vortex of
an important public controversy. Id. at 155. Although the plurality opinion adopted a stan-
dard different from that announced in New York Times, id. at 155, a majority of the Court
held that, at a minimum, the New York Times standard of actual malice was applicable to
defamed public figures bringing libel actions against media defendants. Id. at 162 (Warren,
C.J., concurring) (adopted New York Times standard); id. at 170 (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advocated abandoning New York Times rule and
granting press absolute privilege); id. at 172 (Brennan & White, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (advocated adopting New York Times standard). For detailed discussions
on Butts, see Note, The Constitutional Law of Defamation and Privacy: Butts and Walker, 53
CORNELL L. REV. 649 (1968); Note, Constitutional Law-Defamation Under the First Amend-
ment-The Actual Malice Test and 'Public Figures," 46 N.C.L. REV. 392 (1968); Note, Con-
stitutional Law-Free Speech and Press- Press Comments About College Coach Within Libel
Protection of Associated Press v. Walker, 44 WASH. L. REV. 461 (1969).
95. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
96. Id. at 43-44. In Rosenbloom a radio station broadcaster's reports implicating Ro-
senbloom as a large distributor of obscene materials resulted in his arrest and prosecution
for selling obscene materials. Following acquittal, Rosenbloom sued the broadcaster for
libel. The jury found for Rosenbloom, but the court of appeals reversed. Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969). In affirming the appellate court's judgment,
a plurality of the Supreme Court stated that "[w]e honor the commitment to robust debate
on public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional
protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general con-
cern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous." 403 U.S.
at 43-44. The Court concluded that the arrest of a person for distribution of obscene materi-
als was a matter of public concern and, accordingly, found that the New York Times rule
was applicable. Id. at 45.
97. The Rosenbloom decision also accorded constitutional dimension to the Texas statu-
tory fair comment privilege that permits the media to publish "reasonable and fair comment
or criticism of the official acts of public officials and of other matters of public concern
published for general information." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5432, § 4 (Vernon
1958). The impact of Rosenbloom is understood best when considered in light of the fact
that prior to 1964, the media enjoyed no constitutional protection when publishing defama-
tory statements. See note 79 supra and accompanying text. For detailed discussions of Ro-
senbloom, see Comment, The Expanding Constitutional Protection for the News Media From
Liability for Defamation. Predictability and the New Synthesis, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1547
(1972); Note, Constitutional Law--Libel-Expansion of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
Standard to Include State Civil Libel Action Brought by a Private Individual Involved in an
Event of General or Public Interest, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 651 (1972).
98. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
99. Id. at 326.
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outlet for the John Birch Society. Gertz had represented parents in a civil
action brought against a Chicago policeman who had been convicted of
second degree murder in the killing of the parents' son. Even though
Gertz was not involved in the criminal proceeding, the publication accused
him of instigating a Communist frameup against the policeman. The arti-
cle also falsely implied that Gertz had a criminal record, that he was a
devout Communist, and that he was the main force behind the attack on
the police during the 1968 Democratic Convention. The district court
found that the plaintiff was neither a public official nor a public figure, but
nevertheless applied the New York Times standard of actual malice.1 °
Holding that Gertz had failed to prove that the defendant had acted with
actual malice, the district court entered judgment for the defendant.' 0'
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the defendant could assert the
constitutional privilege because the article concerned a matter of public
interest as defined in Rosenbloom. t02
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court rejected Rosenbloom
and held that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual."' 0 3 The Court recognized, however, that its retreat from the
public interest test of Rosenbloom and the return of control to the states
over private defamation actions would make the press vulnerable to liabil-
ity for defamatory statements concerning a broad range of issues.1° 4 To
avoid any chilling effect on the press resulting from large jury awards
based on a relaxed state standard of liability, 0 5 the Court provided that a
private individual who establishes liability under a less demanding stan-
dard than New York Times would be limited to a recovery of actual dam-
ages. 106
100. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 907, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aft'd, 471 F.2d
801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
101. The jury had found in favor of Gertz, but the trial court entered its judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. 322 F. Supp. at 1000.
102. 471 F.2d 801, 805 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
103. 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). The Court did state, however, that their "inquiry would
involve considerations somewhat different. . . if a State purported to condition civil liabil-
ity on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or
broadcaster of its defamatory potential." Id. at 348. The Court's statement appears to indi-
cate that the minimum standard of liability that would be constitutionally permissible is
negligence. Significantly, the Court by implication surpassed the level of simple negligence
because the content must warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster rather than the
average reasonable man.
104. 418 U.S. at 346-49.
105. The Court observed that the uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages
would compound the media's potential liability for defamatory falsehoods, and thus limit
the robust exercise of public debate. Id. at 349.
106. Id. The Court declined to define actual injury, but it did imply that the term in-
cludes a broad range of injury claims. Those claims that the Court found acceptable, but not
exclusive, include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humil-
iation, and mental anguish and suffering. Id. at 350. The Court further provided that states
could not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages against media defendants unless
the plaintiff could prove actual malice as defined in New York Times. Id. at 349.
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Finally, the Court answered the question of who was a public figure.
The Court held that an individual could become a public figure in one of
two ways. First, individuals who have achieved pervasive fame and noto-
riety may become public figures for all purposes and in all contexts.
0 7
Secondly, individuals who voluntarily "thrust themselves to the forefront
of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved" are considered public figures in relation to the issues sur-
rounding that particular controversy.' 0 8 Gertz was active in community
affairs, had published several books and articles, and was well-known in
legal circles. The Court concluded, however, that these personal charac-
teristics were insufficient to support a finding that Gertz was a public
figure. 1 9
107. Id. at 351.
108. Id. at 345. Near the end of its opinion, the Court again defined the limited purpose
public figure, omitting the language "in order to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved," id. at 351, but the Gertz Court's holding determined that the plaintiff was not a
public figure because "[hie plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of [a] public issue,
nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome." Id. at 352.
Under Gertz, therefore, the Court did not clarify whether the limited purpose public figure
merely had to thrust himself into the vortex of a public controversy or whether he also had
to attempt to influence the outcome of the issues involved. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448 (1976), the Court apparently attempted to clarify this confusion by declaring that in
Gertz it had "defined the meaning of [limited purpose] public figure" to include those who
have " 'thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influ-
ence the resolution of the issues involved.'" Id. at 453 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)) [hereinafter called the Gertz-Firestone definition]. In a recent
opinion addressing the public figure issue, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157
(1979), the Court cited the Gertz-Firestone definition as the proper definition for the limited
purpose public figure. Id. at 164. The Wolston opinion is bothersome, however, because,
similar to Gertz, it separately addresses the issues of whether the plaintiff voluntarily thrust
himself into a public controversy and whether the plaintiff attempted to influence the resolu-
tion of the issues involved. Id. at 165-69. If the Gertz-Firestone definition had controlled,
the Court could have stopped its analysis after it had concluded that Wolston had not volun-
tarily thrust himself into a particular public controversy. The concurrence in Wolston con-
cluded that the majority had held that a prospective public figure "must enter a controversy
in an attempt to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Id. at 169 (Blackmun &
Marshall, JJ., concurring). In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. Ill (1979), decided the
same day as Wolsion, the Court, although citing the Gertz-Firestone definition at one point
in its opinion, id. at 134, held that the plaintiff was not a public figure because he "did not
thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence others." Id. at 135. Argua-
bly, Hutchinson's requirement of influencing others is even more restrictive than the Gertz-
Firestone requirement of influencing issues because although an attempt to influence the
outcome of issues generally would include an attempt to influence persons with regard to
those issues, a person could influence a particular issue's outcome without influencing other
persons. Hutchinson's requirement may be no more than imprecise language, however, be-
cause the Court cites the Gertz-Firestone definition and makes no mention of its change in
language from that definition.
The Gertz Court observed that, under exceptional circumstances, it might recognize a
third category of public figures, those who become public figures through no voluntary ac-
tion of their own. 418 U.S. at 345. The involuntary public figure concept appears, however,
to have little, if any viability today. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 433 U.S. 157
(1979) (plaintiff did not become a public figure when subpoenaed to appear before a grand
jury investigating Soviet spy activity in the United States); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448 (1976) (plaintiff did not become a public figure as a result of her highly publicized
divorce proceeding).
109. 418 U.S. at 352. The plurality opinion's decisive vote came from Justice Blackmun,
who had previously joined the plurality in Rosenbloom. The strength of Gertz was uncer-
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The journey from New York Times to Gertz is the most significant pe-
riod of development in the history of defamation law. This brief review of
Supreme Court involvement in the law of defamation, though by no
means complete, serves as a basis for understanding the radical changes
that took place over a short period of time. Prior to the New York Times
decision in 1964, the press had no constitutional protection when publish-
ing defamatory statements. By 1971 the media enjoyed constitutional pro-
tection when publishing any matter of public interest, and states such as
Texas were mandated to redevelop their defamation law. In Gertz, how-
ever, the Court recognized that its broad application of the New York
Times test impinged upon legitimate state interests. To alleviate this in-
fringement, the Court reinstituted the public figure concept and relin-
quished to the states control over defamation actions brought by private
individuals. The real test would come when states such as Texas, that had
consistently given the individual's reputation priority over the newpaper's
right to disseminate news, began to interpret the constitutional law of defa-
mation as applied to media defendants. The states could proceed along
one of two alternative paths. They could either restrictively apply the con-
cepts of public official, public figure, and public controversy, thereby in-
creasing the class of private individuals, or they could balance the
competing interests involved to generate robust debate on legitimate pub-
lic issues.
III. THE TEXAS REACTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
The first Texas Supreme Court response to New York Times came in El
tain, and matters were complicated by Justice Blackmun's comment that "[i]f my vote were
not needed to create a majority, I would adhere to my prior view." Id. at 354 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). Although Gertz was the product of a divided Court, it was strongly affirmed by
five members of the Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). In Firestone the
defendant had published defamatory statements concerning a divorce award that was
granted to the plaintiff's husband, the son of a wealthy industrialist. The jury verdict for the
plaintiff was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 305 So. 2d 72
(Fla. 1974). Before the United States Supreme Court, the defendant contended that Mrs.
Firestone was a public figure because she had a famous name, was well-known in social
circles, had access to the media as evidenced by her ability to call press conferences, and was
a central party in a divorce proceeding that was a public controversy. The Court rejected the
defendant's claims and held that Mrs. Firestone did not become a public figure by partici-
pating in a divorce proceeding. 424 U.S. at 454-55. The Court also held that a divorce
proceeding was not the type of public controversy contemplated by Gertz. Id. at 454. This
portion of Firestone was used by the Court in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. I I (1979),
to further narrow the public controversy requirement. See notes 169-71 infra and accompa-
nying text. For additional discussions on the effects and implications of Gertz, see Ander-
son, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue Is Control of Press Power, 54 TEXAS L.
REV. 271 (1976); Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone.- 4 Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61
MINN. L. REV. 645 (1977); Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch. Ten Years
of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (1975); Eaton, The
American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and Beyond- An Analyti-
cal Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975); Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RTrr.-CAM. L.J. 47 (1975);
Robertson, Defamation andthe FirstAmendment. In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54
TEXAS L. REV. 199 (1976).
[Vol. 34
COMMENTS
Paso Times, Inc. v. Trexler."10 In Trexler a university professor lead an
anti-Viet Nam War demonstration that aroused a considerable amount of
interest and comment in the city of El Paso. The defendant published sev-
eral editorials stating that it did not agree with the professor's views but
that it did uphold his right to stage a peaceful anti-war demonstration. To
further public discussion, the newspaper received and published certain
letters to the editor that commented on the professor's activities. A publi-
cation accusing the professor of treason formed the basis of his complaint.
The trial court found the professor to be a public figure and, pursuant to a
jury finding that the defendant had not acted with actual malice, rendered
a take nothing judgment against the professor.I' The court of civil ap-
peals reversed," 12 holding that the trial court's definition of actual malice
placed a greater burden on the plaintiff than that required by law." 3
Without deciding whether the trial court's definition of actual malice was
correct, the Texas Supreme Court assumed that it was incorrect because
the New York Times definition was not followed." 14 The court held, how-
ever, that because the plaintiff had failed to prove actual malice under the
New York Times standard the trial court should be affirmed. 1'5 Although
the court did not take a definitive position on what action or inaction
would support a finding of actual malice, it did acknowledge that neither
the failure to investigate the truth of a statement nor the failure to act as a
reasonably prudent man would be sufficient to show that the defendant
published the statements with actual malice." 1 6 The Texas court may have
displayed its real attitude toward the New York Times rule when it ob-
served that the rule "puts a premium on ignorance [and] encourages the
irresponsible publisher not to inquire."'" 7
In 1970 the Texas Supreme Court decided Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
O'Neil. 18 Even though the case did not involve a public official or a pub-
lic figure, and the defamatory statements did not pertain to a matter of
public concern, the court 'nonetheless found that Dun & Bradstreet, as a
credit information service, had characteristics similar to the newspapers in
New York Times and Trexler and therefore was entitled to the protection
given in New York Times. 19 The motivations that led to New York Times
did not warrant the conclusion reached in Dun & Bradstreet. In New York
110. 447 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. 1969).
111. Id. at 404.
112. 439 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), rev'd, 447 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. 1969).
113. The trial court had defined actual malice to mean "a desire or intent to injure a
person through a deliberate falsehood or with actual knowledge of its probable falsity." 447
S.W.2d at 405.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 406.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)).
118. 456 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1970). Dun & Bradstreet provided a credit information serv-
ice but erroneously issued a special notice that the plaintiff had filed a voluntary bankruptcy
petition. The notice was sent to 14 subscribers who had previously requested information
concerning the plaintifs credit status. Plaintiff sued for libel, and the defendant pleaded a
defense of common law conditional privilege. See note 121 infra.
119. 456 S.W.2d at 900-01.
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Times the Court based its holding on the need for robust and open debate
on public issues,' 20 but no comparable need existed in Dun & Brad-
street. 21 The decision is even more perplexing when considered in light
of the Texas court's tendency to uphold the private individual's right to
protect his reputation. 22
Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc. 123 provided the Texas Supreme Court
with an opportunity to interpret and apply the line of United States
Supreme Court cases beginning with New York Times and culminating
with Gertz.' 24 Foster was an established engineer in Laredo, Texas and
the elected county surveyor of Webb County. Over the previous ten years,
Webb County also had employed Foster as a private consultant on a large
majority of the county's engineering projects. Foster did not have a per-
manent position with the county, however. When a flooding problem
arose in a local subdivision, the commissioners' court employed Foster to
investigate the drainage problem in the subdivision and to determine the
availability of federal grants to correct the problem. After Foster had
completed these activities, the defendant's newspaper published an article
stating that "the flooded area in question was platted by Jack Foster, who
doubles as a consultant engineer for Webb County."' 25 Foster subse-
quently sued the newspaper, alleging that the article was libelous because
it had implied that he was directly responsible for the flooding problem
and that he was unethical in accepting employment with Webb County
when a direct conflict of interest existed. Both parties agreed that the por-
tion of the article stating that Foster had platted the flooded area was false.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, 126 and the court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that Foster was
both a public figure and a public official.' 27 The court further held that the
summary judgment proof had not established as a matter of law that the
newspaper had acted with actual malice.' 28 Reversing the court of civil
appeals, the Texas Supreme Court held that Foster was not a public figure,
120. 376 U.S. at 270.
121. The court appears to have made a serious error in applying New York Times in Dun
& Bradstreet. Although each case involved privileges, Dun & Bradstreet had invoked a com-
mon law conditional privilege recognizing that a credit reporting service publication may be
privileged if the publication is made without actual malice. See W. PROSSER, supra note 15,
§ 115, at 790, 794. Based on the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in New York
Times, the qualified common law privilege applicable to credit reporting services should not
be accorded the same reverence as the media's constitutional privilege.
122. The Dun & Bradstreet case continues to be a source of confusion in libel actions that
do not involve media defendants. At least one court of civil appeals has expressed concern
over the supreme court's classification of Dun & Bradstreet as a media defendant. See
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Dixon, 575 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978,
no writ); Roegelein Provision Co. v. Mayen, 566 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
123. 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1976).
124. Trexler and Dun & Bradstreet were decided in the interim between New York Times
and Gertz.
125. 541 S.W.2d at 811.
126. Id
127. 530 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), rev'd, 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976).
128. 530 S.W.2d at 618.
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and although he was a public official, the actual malice test of New York
Times was not applicable because the publication did not refer to his con-
duct in an official capacity. 129
A. Public Official
To support the contention that Foster was a public official in his capac-
ity as a private engineering consultant for the county, the newspaper cited
the holding in Rosenblatt v. Baer 30 that a government employee who "has
such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in
[his] qualifications and performance beyond the general public interest in
the qualifications and performance of all government employees" is within
the New York Times rule.' 31 The court rejected the newspaper's conten-
tion that Foster was the type of government employee indentified in Rosen-
blatt, because: (1) Foster's consultant activities resulted in no significant
public interest; (2) Foster had little, if any, authority to exercise on behalf
of the county; (3) Foster could not personally authorize the expenditure of
public funds to solve the flooding problem; (4) evidence showed that Fos-
ter did not supervise any other county employees; and (5) evidence indi-
cated that Foster had very little public contact. 32 Although the factors
that the court considered important clearly related to Foster's lack of re-
sponsibility and authority within the county government, the Rosenblatt
Court did not hold that a government employee must possess actual au-
thority to come within the New York Times rule. Rather, the Court held
that the New York Times standard applied to government employees "who
have, or appear to thepublic to have, substantial responsibility for. . . the
conduct of governmental affairs."' 33 Contrary to the Texas Supreme
Court's opinion, Foster could have appeared to the public to have had
substantial responsibility within the county government. The county
presented Foster to the public as a person who had been employed to solve
the area's flooding problem and to determine if a federal grant was avail-
able to provide the necessary funds to correct the problem. Arguably, an
employee presented to the public in this fashion would appear to have
substantial responsibilities within the county government.
The media's constitutional privilege recognized in New York Times re-
129. 541 S.W.2d at 814, 817.
130. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
131. Id at 86.
132. 541 S.W.2d at 813-14.
133. 383 U.S. at 85 (emphasis added). The Court has recently made clear, however, that
the reach of Rosenblatt is not unlimited. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979),
the Court stated that although it "has not provided precise boundaries for the category of
'public official;' it cannot be thought to include all public employees." Id at 119 n.8. As to
this second category of public officials, the key question is how far the Supreme Court will
go in restricting the concept espoused in Rosenblatt. The Court has not recently addressed
this issue, but it might be willing to allow the state courts to determine which government
officials have, or appear to have, substantial responsibility within the government. There-
fore, states such as Texas may effectively limit the scope of the public official concept by
merely determining that the government official did not have, or appear to have, substantial
responsibility for the conduct of government affairs.
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quires that the defamatory statements refer to the official conduct of the
official being defamed.134 While the Texas Supreme Court had little dif-
ficulty finding that Foster was a public official in his elected capacity, 35
the court concluded that because the publication did not relate to Foster's
official conduct, the newspaper was not entitled to the protection of the
New York Times standard of actual malice.' 36 This determination
presents several difficulties. Before the Foster decision, the official conduct
concept had been interpreted liberally by the United States Supreme Court
to bring libel actions within the New York Times rule. 137 Disregarding
these interpretations, the Foster court concluded that the article defaming
Foster neither expressly nor impliedly referred to Foster's fitness for public
office.' 38 The court's conclusion is not well-founded because the defama-
tory publication does impliedly refer to Foster's fitness for office. The arti-
cle stated that a portion of Del Mar Hills "was platted by Jack Foster, who
doubles as a consultant engineer for Webb County." 139 The article's refer-
ence to Foster by name referred to Foster's status as the elected county
surveyor. This portion of the publication could have been interpreted to
imply that a conflict existed between Foster's private employment with the
county and his position as an elected county official. Indeed, Foster be-
lieved that reasonable readers could make such an inference, as evidenced
by his complaint alleging that such an implication did exist and that he
was entitled to compensation for his injuries.' 40
134. 376 U.S. at 280.
135. 541 S.W.2d at 814.
136. Id at 814-15. To support its conclusion, the court stated that the publication "made
no express reference to Foster's fitness for the office. . . , nor was it concerned with Foster's
performance of his official duties." Id at 815. The Foster court appears to have ignored the
United States Supreme Court's statement in Gertz that "society's interest in the officers of
government is not strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties." 418 U.S. 323,
344 (1974).
137. For example, in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court held that the
official conduct rule included all conduct that touched upon an official's fitness for office and
applied with special force to elected officials. Id at 77. Garrison was followed by Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) and Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295
(1971). In Roy the Court stated that the official conduct concept had been diluted substan-
tially and strongly implied that the concept may be of little significance in future cases in-
volving public officials and candidates for public office. 401 U.S. at 274. The action in
Damron was brought by the mayor of a small town. Even though the defamatory publica-
tion did not refer specifically to the mayor's public office, the Court held that the New York
Times rule was applicable. 401 U.S. at 300. These cases strongly suggest that the official
conduct concept had little vitality at the time of Foster. The Foster court treated these deci-
sions in footnotes but distinguished them on questionable grounds. Garrison was avoided by
the court's conclusion that the article did not expressly or impliedly relate to Foster's fitness
for office. 541 S.W.2d at 814, 815 n.7. Roy was distinguished on the basis that the publica-
tion did not refer to Foster's position as county surveyor. Id The Foster court concluded
that Damron was questionable authority for the proposition that the publication need not
refer to the plaintiff's elected office to be constitutionally protected. Id at 815 n.8.
138. 541 S.W.2d at 815.
139. Id at 811.
140. Id For a similar analysis of the Foster court's treatment of the official conduct




The court held that Foster was not a public figure' 4 ' under either of the
two categories defined in Gertz.' 42 The court was correct in holding that
Foster was not a public figure for all purposes, but was incorrect in con-
cluding that Foster had failed to voluntarily enter a particular public con-
troversy. To support its latter conclusion, the court observed: (1) Foster
had not assumed a special role in the resolution of the controversy; (2)
Foster had no personal interest in the resolution of the controversy; and (3)
Foster did not attempt to influence the outcome of the flooding contro-
versy through the media.143 These factors are valid considerations in de-
termining whether an individual has assumed the role of a public figure in
a particular controversy,'" but two of the three factors may have been
applied improperly by the Foster court. Arguably, Foster voluntarily in-
volved himself in a public issue by accepting employment to resolve the
flooding problem. Because of the nature of his employment and his as-
signed responsibilities, Foster may have assumed special prominence in
resolving the controversy. Another reasonable conclusion is that Foster
had a special interest in the outcome of the controversy. Had Foster been
successful in resolving the flooding problem, his professional reputation
probably would have improved, thereby leading to additional employment
opportunities in both public and private sectors.
The court analogized Foster to the plaintiff in Gertz, but the two are
distinguishable on several grounds. In Gertz the controversy centered on a
criminal prosecution in which the plaintiff had no direct involvement. 45
Moreover, the closest connection that the plaintiff had with the criminal
controversy was an appearance at the coroner's inquest concerning the boy
who was killed. 46 In comparison, Foster voluntarily accepted employ-
ment to aid the resolution of a public controversy and represented himself
to the public as a person capable of doing so. The Foster court's question-
able analogy may have led to an improper conclusion.
C. Standard of Care
According to Gertz, as long as states do not impose strict liability, they
may define the appropriate standard of liability in defamation actions
brought against media defendants by private individuals. 47 In Foster, the
141. 541 S.W.2d at 817.
142. See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
143. 541 S.W.2d at 817.
144. Gertz directed the courts to look at the nature and extent of the plaintiff's involve-
ment in the controversy when determining whether the plaintiff is a public figure. 418 U.S.
at 352.
145. Id at 325-26.
146. A holding that every attorney who involves himself in a highly publicized criminal
prosecution becomes a public figure for the duration of the controversy could cause attor-
neys to avoid such cases. This result could, in effect, infringe upon an accused's constitu-
tional right to counsel. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall. . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
147. 418 U.S. at 348. The state responses to Gertz have resulted in three standards for
19801
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Texas Supreme Court adopted negligence as the proper standard. 48 This
standard is consistent with Gertz, which recognized that states have a
greater interest in protecting the reputations of private citizens than they
have in protecting the reputations of public officials and public figures.149
State decisions requiring the same quantum of evidence to prove a media
defendant's liability when defaming private individuals as when defaming
public officials and public figures are conceptually inconsistent with Gertz.
D. Foster Rationalized
The Foster decision is the product of two major forces. First, the Texas
Supreme Court relied heavily on Gertz, which represents a major retreat
by the United States Supreme Court in its application of constitutional
protection for the media when it publishes defamatory statements concern-
ing matters of public interest. Secondly, although the court's decision may
not fall in line with New York Times and its progeny, its deviation is un-
derstandable when considered in light of the Texas Supreme Court's tradi-
tional treatment of media defendants that have libeled Texas citizens.
Although Gertz returned to the states control over media defamation
actions involving private citizens, that control appears to be quite limited.
The states may not impose strict liability on media defendants; 50 the
plaintiff must prove actual damages before benefiting from a relaxed stan-
dard of liability; '5' and the plaintiff is required to prove actual malice to
determining the liability of a media defendant defaming a private individual. New York
has adopted a standard based on grossly irresponsible conduct. Chapadeau v. Utica Ob-
server-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975). A minority
of states has retained the New York Times actual malice standard. Walker v. Colorado
Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Aafco
Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321
N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976). A large majority of states has adopted a
negligence standard of liability. Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560
P.2d 1216 (1977); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356
(1975); Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1976); Gobin v. Globe Publishing
Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Wilson v. Capitol City Press, 315 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct.
App.), writ refdper curiam, 320 So. 2d 203 (La. 1975); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers,
Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350
A.2d 688 (1976); Walters v. Sanford Herald, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 233, 228 S.E.2d 766 (1976);
Thomas H. Maloney & Sons v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494
(1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85
(Okla. 1976); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
148. 541 S.W.2d at 820. The court stated that "[tihe negligence standard of liability cou-
pled with the 'actual injury' requirement established in Gertz provides a useful beginning
point for the development of constitutional defamation law and has the capability of achiev-
ing a fair balance between the competing interests at stake." Id.
149. The Gertz Court emphasized:
[The private individual] has not accepted public office or assumed an "influen-
tial role in ordering society." ... He has relinquished no part of his interest in
the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compel-
ling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood.
Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public
officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.
418 U.S. at 345 (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 347.
15 1. Id at 348-49.
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recover punitive damages.' 52 A close look at Gertz indicates, however,
that the amount of control returned to the states is not as limited as it first
appears. For example, although Gertz does not define actual injury, it
states that the term does include such injuries as "impairment of reputa-
tion and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental
anguish and suffering. 153 These injuries are subjective, and, when asserted
by the plaintiff, will not be easily discredited by the media defendant. 54
Moreover, Gertz implies that the Supreme Court will classify plaintiffs as
private individuals when the evidence does not clearly show that the plain-
tiff is a public figure.' 55 This portion of Gertz strengthens state positions
that narrowly apply the public figure concept. Finally, Gertz allows the
states to reestablish their dominant position in shaping the development of
defamation actions brought against media defendants by private individu-
als. The Texas Supreme Court readily accepted the return of control, and
the results in Foster indicate that the court chose a restrictive application
of the public official and public figure concepts.
The second major factor contributing to the results in Foster is the Texas
Supreme Court's return to its pre-New York Times position of favoring an
individual's right to protect his reputation over the media's right to publish
freely matters of public concern. Foster's treatment of the public figure
issue clearly evidences the court's intention to expand this protection of
private individuals by limiting the concept of the public figure. The court's
adoption of negligence as the standard of liability for media defendants
publishing defamatory statements concerning private individuals is further
evidence of its intention to protect fully the individual's reputation.
Unlike the public figure issue, little support exists in pre-1976 United
States Supreme Court decisions for Foster's treatment of public officials
who have been defamed by the media.' 56 Prior to 1964 the media had
relied principally on Texas's statutory privilege of fair comment when con-
fronted with a libel action. From the time the fair comment privilege was
enacted, 157 the Texas Supreme Court consistently limited the statute's
reach in order to uphold the individual's right to protect his reputation.
Similarly, the Foster court effectively limited the constitutional protection
granted by New York Times by restricting the extent of the public official
concept. The ultimate effect of this restrictive interpretation broadens the
class of private individuals who may benefit from the negligence standard
of liability placed on media defendants libeling such persons. The Texas
court clearly has taken a restrictive approach in applying the media's con-
152. Id. at 349.
153. Id at 350.
154. Common arguments against awards based on subjective injury are that they cannot
be measured in terms of money, that they promote litigation, and that the physical conse-
quences of such injuries are too remote. See W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 54, at 327. Prior
to Gertz, however, the courts consistently rejected these objections and routinely awarded
damages for subjective injuries. Id § 112, at 761.
155. 418 U.S. at 352.
156. See notes 130-40 supra and accompanying text.
157. 1901 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 26, § 3, at 30.
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stitutional protection. The relevant inquiry, however, is whether the Fos-
ter decision, which continues to be the leading Texas case in defamation
actions brought against media defendants, is compatible with the United
States Supreme Court's views as expressed in its two most recent decisions
concerning defamatory publications.
IV. CURRENT POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz, some legal commenta-
tors expressed the view that the Court had begun a retreat from its previ-
ous broad application of constitutional protection to the press 58 when
publishing defamatory statements. On June 26, 1979, the Court confirmed
that view when it announced its two most recent defamation decisions,
Hutchinson v. Proxmire159 and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association.160
A. Hutchinson v. Proxmire
In Hutchinson the plaintiff sued for damages resulting from libelous
statements made by Proxmire, a United States Senator. When the state-
ments were made, the plaintiff was the director of research at a state
mental hospital, and was performing governmental research under state
and federal grants to measure aggression levels in animals under specific
conditions. The National Aeronautics and Space Agency was particularly
interested in the results of the research to help resolve problems associated
with human confinement in close quarters for extended periods of time.
Through the use of his "Golden Fleece of the Month Award,"' 16' Proxmire
published statements that accused Hutchinson and the funded governmen-
tal agencies of misusing taxpayer dollars. At the trial level, the district
court concluded that Hutchinson was a public figure because he actively
solicited federal money, received press coverage of his research, and vol-
untarily made expenditures for research in which the public had an inter-
est. 162 Finding that the evidence could not support a finding of actual
malice, the court granted Proxmire's motion for summary judgment. 163
The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that Hutchinson was a public
figure for the limited purpose of commenting on his receipt of funds for
research projects.' 64 To support its conclusion, the court of appeals noted
that Hutchinson's receipt of research funds had been published in local
newspapers and that Hutchinson had had access to the press as evidenced
by the newspaper and wire service reports on his response to the Golden
158. See Ashdown, supra note 109, at 646, 657, 672-73; Brosnahan, supra note 109, at
778, 790; Robertson, supra note 109, at 199.
159. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
160. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
161. Proxmire initiated the Golden Fleece Award to publicize his examples of wasteful
governmental spending. Id
162. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1327 (W.D. Wis. 1977), aft'd, 579 F.2d
1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 443 U.S. I11 (1979).
163. 431 F. Supp. at 1330.
164. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd and re-
manded, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
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Fleece Award. 65 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Hutchinson
was not a public figure.' 66 Although the Court agreed that Hutchinson
was well-known to a small category of professionals and that he had lim-
ited access to the media, it concluded that these characteristics were insuffi-
cient to make Hutchinson a public figure. 167 In light of the Court's
determinations on the public figure issue in Gertz, its failure to classify
Hutchinson as a public figure is not surprising.' 68
The Court also rejected the court of appeals finding with respect to the
public controversy issue, concluding that Hutchinson had not thrust him-
self into a "particular public controversy."' 69 Reasoning that Proxmire's
concern over misuse of taxpayer dollars was of general concern to all tax-
paying citizens, the Court concluded that Hutchinson was not a public
figure for a limited purpose because the particular controversy require-
ment had not been met.170 Although the distinction between a particular
public controversy and a controversy of general concern is not clear, the
Court appears to have concluded that controversies that are of interest to
all citizens do not meet the particular public controversy requirement of
the limited public figure concept.' 7' At the very least, the Court signifi-
cantly restricted the range of issues that qualify as a particular controversy.
Moreover, the Court appeared to require that a limited purpose public
figure must "thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influ-
ence others. ' 172 This requirement that the prospective public figure at-
165. 579 F.2d at 1034-35.
166. 443 U.S. at 136.
167. Id. at 134-35. The Court decided that Hutchinson's activities exposed him to the
public no more than other members of his profession. The Court stated that to the extent
Hutchinson's activities became a controversy, they became so only as a result of Proxmire's
award. Id Relying on Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979), the Court
held that a private individual cannot be made a public figure by the media's own conduct.
443 U.S. at 135. See notes 182-97 infra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
169. 443 U.S. at 134-35.
170. Id at 135.
171. The Court's rejection of controversies of general concern was based on its statement
in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), that the "use of such subject-matter classifi-
cations to determine the extent of constitutional protection afforded defamatory falsehoods
may too often result in an improper balance between the competing interests in this area."
Id at 456. The Court may reasonably conclude that the particular controversy requirement
eases the Court's burden of determining if a private individual has become a public figure.
The Court is, however, shirking its self-imposed obligation of properly protecting the com-
peting interests (see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974)), by attempting
to ease the difficulty of its decision. Certainly, questions of general interest may become
raging public controversies. This nation's recent involvement in the Vietnam War and the
controversies created by our continual engagement in that war are illustrative. The Court
would find it difficult to maintain that a leader of a large pro-war or anti-war movement
could not become a public figure merely because the war was of national concern. The
Hutchinson Court did not provide definitive guidelines for those public issues that will con-
stitute controversies of general concern. A reasonable assumption, therefore, would be that
the Court will make its determination on the facts presented by each case. See Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 n.8 (1979). This observation supports the conclu-
sion that state courts will have the same discretion as the Court provided for itself. This
result represents yet another way in which states such as Texas have been given the opportu-
nity to apply the constitutional privilege restrictively.
172. 443 U.S. at 135.
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tempt to influence others is a significant change from the Gertz
requirement of attempting "to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved."' 173 These limitations are yet further indications of the Court's
present trend toward retracting the broad constitutional protection af-
forded the media by pre-Gertz cases.
A more troublesome aspect of Hutchinson is the Court's implication that
persons who become public figures for a particular public controversy
must have free access to the media prior to the publication of the defama-
tory statements. 174 According to Gertz, a person becomes a public figure
when he is a public figure in all contexts or when he becomes a public
figure by thrusting himself into the vortex of a public controversy. 75 A
person who is a public figure in all contexts probably has access to the
press at all times because of the very nature of his pervasive fame. This
conclusion does not necessarily apply, however, to those individuals who
become public figures for a particular public controversy. In Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts 176 the Court recognized that a public figure in a partic-
ular controversy must have "sufficient access to the means of
counterargument to be able 'to expose through discussion the falsehood
and fallacies of the defamatory statements."'' 77 Butts supports the proposi-
tion that to be a public figure a person must only have access to the press to
refute defamatory publications that concern him. The Butts decision does
not, however, dictate a conclusion that a public figure must have access to
the media prior to the publication of the defamatory statements. To this
extent, Hutchinson is in conflict with Butts. Because a person may be a
public figure for limited purposes even though he does not have access to
the press until after the defamatory statement is published, Butts is the
more reasonable approach to the question of media access. 178
173. 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). Hutchinson's use of the phrase "to influence others" may
be imprecise language in light of the Court's citation to Gertz and its language requiring the
public figure to attempt to influence the outcome of issues. In a companion case, Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 165 (1979), the majority used the Gertz language in conclud-
ing that the plaintiff was not a limited purpose public figure. See note 108 supra for a
discussion of the confusion surrounding the Court's definition of a limited purpose public
figure.
174. 443 U.S. at 134-35. Rejecting Proxmire's assertion that Hutchinson had access to
the media sufficient to qualify him as a public figure, the Court stated that Hutchinson's
"access, such as it was, came after the alleged libel." Id. (emphasis added).
175. 418 U.S. at 345.
176. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
177. Id. at 155 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)). Similar language was used in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
178. For example, assume that a corporate executive who has no pervasive fame pays a
million-dollar bribe to a federal official to convince the official to purchase the corporation's
product. At the time of the bribe the executive has no independent access to the media. At a
later date a newspaper discovers that the bribe has been made and prints what it believes to
be an accurate account of the executive's bribe. In an effort to clear his name, the executive
approaches the news media to refute all charges made against him, and because of the news-
worthiness of the event, the media accommodates the executive's request. Subsequent to the
executive's public response, he is tried on criminal charges for making the bribe. The execu-
tive is ultimately acquitted because the prosecution is unable to produce its key witness. To
fully vindicate his name, the executive brings an action for libel against the media for its
previous account of the bribe. Although the proposed hypothetical appears to involve a
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The implied requirement of prior media access may have a disastrous
effect on the limited public figure concept, as there are numerous situations
in which a person may voluntarily enter the vortex of a particular public
controversy before he has access to the press. The Hutchinson Court con-
cluded, however, that although the press might allow later access, "those
charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own
defense by making the claimant a public figure."' 179 Clearly, the Court's
concern is valid, but it should not control the determination of whether an
individual is a public figure. The Court appears to have forgotten its pre-
vious teachings that a public figure who enters the vortex of a particular
public controversy also subjects himself to the public's scrutiny with regard
to his involvement in that controversy. 180 The importance of media access
by such individuals is not that they have access to the press prior to an
alleged defamation, but that the channels of communication remain open
to refute the defamatory publication. When, following the alleged defa-
mation, the channels of communication are closed, patent unfairness
would result if the individual who had prior access were subjected to the
higher burden required of defamed public figures. If the channels of com-
munication are open to an individual that has subjected himself to public
scrutiny, however, the media should not be subject to a relaxed standard of
liability. 18
B. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association182
In Wolston the plaintiff sued Reader's Digest Association for publishing
a book that asserted that Wolston was a Soviet spy, when in fact Wolston
had never been convicted of such a crime. Fifteen years before the publi-
cation, Wolston had failed to respond to a grand jury subpoena issued for
the purpose of aiding an investigation of Soviet intelligence activities in
the United States. A federal judge then ordered Wolston to show cause
legitimate and particular public controversy, Hutchinson, unlike prior decisions, may defeat
the media's claim that the executive was a public figure because the executive had no media
access prior to the defamatory publication. In the hypothetical, the corporate executive vol-
untarily thrust himself into a particular public controversy, but the nature of the controversy
would have postponed public awareness until after the defamatory statements were pub-
lished. To foreclose a media defendant's public figure claim in such a situation merely be-
cause the individual gained access to the press after the publication is unreasonable.
179. 443 U.S. at 134.
180. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). In Gertz the Court stated that
"communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that ... public figures have
voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood con-
cerning them." Id The Hutchinson Court's holdings concerning the particular controversy
requirement and the prior media access requirement place the press in the precarious posi-
tion of making these determinations prior to publication. These aspects of Hutchinson, for
all practical purposes, eliminate the media's right to assume that a public figure has exposed
himself to public scrutiny.
181. This conclusion does not suggest that a mere interview with the defamer should be
sufficient to establish access to the media. As the Court observed, the media cannot create its
own public figure. The media access requirement of Butts and Gertz would appear to be
satisfied, however, when the defamed individual has the press at his disposal following the
alleged defamation.
182. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
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why he should not be held in criminal contempt of court for failing to
respond to the grand jury subpoena. 83 Wolston pled guilty to the con-
tempt charge. During the six-week period between Wolston's failure to
appear and his sentencing, several news stories were published discussing
these events. Following the sentencing, the news coverage subsided, and
Wolston was able to return to a normal life. In Wolston's defamation ac-
tion against Reader's Digest, the district court granted the Association's
motion for summary judgment, holding that Wolston was a public figure
and that the evidence did not support a finding of actual malice. 84 The
court of appeals agreed, 185 but the Supreme Court reversed, deciding that
Wolston was not made a public figure by his failure to respond to the
grand jury subpoena. 8 6
Citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 87 the Court stated that private in-
dividuals deserved protection more than public figures because they do not
expose themselves voluntarily to increased risk of injury from defamatory
falsehoods. 88 The Court held that Wolston was entitled to the protection
afforded to private individuals because he was an unwilling participant in
a government espionage investigation rather than a person who had volun-
tarily thrust himself into a public controversy.' 89 To support its holding,
the Court observed that Wolston's participation was limited to that neces-
sary for his defense on the contempt charge, and that he had declined to
discuss with the press his refusal to honor the grand jury's subpoena. 190
Moreover, Wolston did not attempt to utilize the citation of contempt "as a
fulcrum to create public discussion about the methods being used in con-
nection with [the] investigation or prosecution."' 9' Because Wolston did
not purposefully assume special prominence in the resolution of a public
question, the Court held that he was not a public figure.' 92
183. The evidence suggested that Wolston's ill health was the reason for his failure to
appear. Id. at 166, 169.
184. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167, 176, 179-81 (D.D.C. 1977),
afj'd, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
185. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 157
(1979). The court of appeals held that the espionage investigation was a public controversy
and that Wolston had voluntarily entered that controversy by refusing to appear in front of
the grand jury. 578 F.2d at 431.
186. 443 U.S. at 165, 168.
187. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
188. 443 U.S. at 164; accord, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
189. 443 U.S. at 166.
190. Id at 167.
191. Id at 168.
192. Id The Association also argued that Wolston became a public figure for a limited
purpose solely by reason of his criminal conduct. Id Relying on Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976), the Court concluded that a person who engages in criminal con-
duct does not automatically become a public figure for the limited purpose of comment on
his criminal conduct. 443 U.S. at 168-69. Firestone recognized that in some instances a
person could become a public figure through participation in litigation, but the Court con-
cluded that in the normal situation an individual is drawn into the litigation involuntarily
rather than by purposefully assuming a particular role in the litigation. 424 U.S. at 457. The
Firestone Court supported its decision by concluding that the media's interest in judicial
proceedings was protected by Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), which
recognized that the media have an absolute privilege to publish an accurate account of pub-
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Even though Justices Marshall and Blackmun disagreed with the major-
ity's definition of the limited purpose public figure, 93 they did agree that
Wolston was not a public figure at the time the libel took place. 94 The
concurring opinion concluded that a determination of whether Wolston
was a public figure at the time of his contempt conviction was unnecessary
because he had lost that status, if ever attained, by the time the libel was
published. 195 According to the concurring opinion, once a person becomes
a public figure, he does not remain so for all time.' 96 To Justices Marshall
and Blackmun the passage of time is critically relevant to whether an in-
jured party continues to enjoy effective media access and whether he
knowingly chooses to run the continual risk of public scrutiny. Unfortu-
nately, the majority opinion does not clarify whether the Court at a future
date may accept this position.'9 7 Because of the Court's recent trend to-
ward reducing the scope of the public figure concept, however, the position
of the concurrence probably will be adopted.
V. CONCLUSION
Texas Supreme Court decisions prior to 1964 had favored the rights of a
lic records concerning a judicial proceeding. Id at 495. Significantly, Wolsion appears to
expand the Firestone doctrine of protecting conduct in a civil action in progress to include
an individual's criminal conduct prior to prosecution. This expansion has little support from
either Firestone or Cox because each relates to publications concerning the records of the
judicial proceedings. In comparison, Wolston expands this concept to criminal conduct that
took place prior to the judicial proceeding. The Wolston holding does, however, appear to
be limited to the principle that an individual's criminal conduct does not automatically
make him a public figure. 443 U.S. at 168-69. Future decisions should not utilize Wolston
to defeat a claim that an individual is a public figure when the conduct involved is similar to
that proposed by the hypothetical in this Comment. See note 173 supra. The courts may
reasonably weigh a number of factors, including the severity of the crime, the nature of the
crime, and the purpose for which the crime was committed.
193. 443 U.S. at 169-70. Justices Marshall and Blackmun declared that the majority un-
necessarily restricted the limited purpose public figure concept by defining that concept to
include only those persons who "enter a controversy in an attempt to influence the resolu-
tion of the issues involved." Id. at 169. Such a definition, the Justices stated, apparently
means that a person is a limited purpose public figure only if he "mounts a rostrum" advo-
cating a particular view. Id Justices Marshall and Blackmun concluded that the Court, on
the facts as presented, should have relied on Gertz, which in their opinion "held that a
person may become a public figure for a limited range of issues if he 'voluntarily injects
himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy.'" Id at 170 (quoting Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974)). The concurring opinion's quotation from
Gertz exemplifies the confusion that exists as to the proper definition of the limited purpose
public figure. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), decided the same day as
Wolston, Justices Blackmun and Marshall, without complaint, joined the majority opinion
wherein the Court used language identical to that used in Wolston. See note 108 supra.
194. 443 U.S. at 170.
195. Id Justices Blackmun and Marshall observed that their conclusion would place a
greater risk of liability upon authors recounting historical events than upon journalists re-
porting current events. Id at 171. The Justices' conclusion is warranted because historians
have the opportunity to fully research facts prior to publication while reporters must make
immediate decisions as to whether to publish daily news events. Id
196. Id at 170.
197. Because the parties had not asserted the question before the Supreme Court, the
majority declined to decide whether an individual who is once a public figure may lose that
status through the passage of time. Id at 166 n.7.
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libel plaintiff over the rights of a media defendant. Foster v. Laredo News-
papers, Inc. adopts this general pre-1964 approach and suggests that the
Texas Supreme Court will continue to support the defamed individual.
Significantly, two recent United States Supreme Court decisions, Hutchin-
son v. Proxmire and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, confirm the
Foster court's analysis. Both decisions suggest that the Supreme Court
currently favors a position of restricting, and possibly redefining, the con-
stitutional privilege provided by New York Times and its progeny. These
recent Supreme Court decisions effectively reduce the boundaries of the
public figure concept, indicating that a similar approach may be taken to-
ward the public official concept. The ultimate effect of the recent Supreme
Court decisions is to expand the class of private individuals, thus returning
much of the defamation arena to the states. Although these decisions
make clear that the Foster analysis is consistent with the position of the
United States Supreme Court, Texas courts are not likely to be permitted
to return to the same level of restrictions that they placed on the press prior
to 1964. How far the Texas courts can go to avoid the New York Times
standard cannot be determined readily from existing Supreme Court case
law. The Supreme Court clearly is willing, however, to recognize the
state's interests in defamation cases when the state exercises its rights with-
out obvious abuse. The important point to be recognized by the Texas
media is that they will continue to experience close judicial scrutiny when
sued for defaming a private citizen.
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